A dual income tax system, combining progressive taxation of labor income with proportional taxation of income from capital, may or may not be unambiguously inequality reducing. Examples show that the degree of correlation between the distributions of wage and capital income, the degree of tax rate differentiation in the DIT, and reranking of tax-payers can be expected to complicate a clear-cut analysis. We trace out what can be said definitively, obtaining sufficient conditions for unambiguous inequality reduction in certain cases, and more generally identifying the nature of the implicit redistribution between labor and capital income components which is sufficient to ensure overall inequality reduction.
Introduction
Dual income tax (henceforth DIT) systems were introduced in the Nordic countries in the late eighties and early nineties, 1 and are spreading. Sørensen (2005) and Genser and Reutter (2007) list more than a dozen non-Nordic EU countries in which aspects of dual income taxation are present or under active consideration, on wage income. 5 Thus in Norway, small business owners have found it advantageous to choose incorporation into a widely held corporation, enabling them to reduce their tax bills significantly by paying themselves shareholder income in place of managerial wages (see Thoresen and Alstadsaeter, 2010) . 6 Another problem is the obvious discrimination coming from a differentiated tax system per se (this is lessened by turning attention towards a life-cycle perspective, in which the equal taxation of capital and labor incomes discriminates against "early earners" and "late spenders" and favors investment in human capital compared to financial investments and investments in physical capital, see Sørensen, 1994) . Thus, the Norwegian DIT underwent a major revision in 2006, introducing a substantial realignment of dividend income and wage income taxation (see Sørensen, 2005 , for further details) 7 which, with reference to the classical work of William Vickrey, can be seen as aiming at maintaining tax neutrality (Vickrey, 1939) at the same time as introducing progression as "taxation which tends to promote economic equality" (Vickrey, 1947, p.3) .
In this paper, we discuss under what conditions a DIT system is inequality reducing. Traditionally, efficiency issues have taken the forefront in DIT analysis, but recent controversies in academic and social fora suggest that the inequality concept is also very important. As we see the gaps between the rich and the poor widening in many countries (OECD, 2011) , and the growing concern over the morality of capital markets (Atkinson, 2009) , we may question the idea of letting capital income be taxed more leniently than labor income. Some economists now suggest that increasing capital income taxes and/or introducing some degree of progressivity in them "would not be so bad after all" (Conesa, Kitao and Krueger, 2009) . At any rate, given the increasing popularity of DIT systems, we believe that it will benefit the discussion and the formulation of fiscal policies to establish how such systems can work to reduce inequality.
For a tax whose base comprises income of all forms combined, it is wellknown that progression assures an unambiguously inequality reducing effect. The early paper of Fellman (1976) speaks to this, as does the recent and elegant treatment of Ju and Moreno-Ternero (2008) . But there is a lacuna in tax theory in 5 See Fuest and Huber (2001) and Christiansen and Toumala (2008) for the optimal tax implication of labor income being camouflaged as capital income. 6 The legitimacy of the Norwegian DIT was not helped by some high-profile celebrities of show business and politics being able to take advantage of it. Such effects were instrumental in causing the revision of the Norwegian DIT in 2006. 7 Sweden switched back to double taxation of dividends from passive shareholding in 1994 and the 2005 tax reform in Finland changed their DIT system in a similar way (Genser and Schindler, 2007) . In Denmark the 1987 reform bill included progressive taxation of capital already from the beginning (Sørensen, 1998). respect of a DIT: for a DIT system, there is no inequality-reducing guarantee, even though a modified form of the progressive principle is enshrined in a typical DIT. We know of only two papers which venture in the direction of discussing principles for a DIT system to reduce inequality, that of Calonge and Tejada (2011) , which examines a particular "bilinear reform" of a dual income tax or pair of different one-dimensional taxes, extending a result of Pfähler (1984) for a onedimensional tax, and that of Kristjánsson (2012) , which determines the progressivity effect of a DIT in terms of Gini indices, as done by Kakwani (1977) for a one-dimensional tax. We return to each of these two contributions later in our paper. 8 We analyze a typical DIT system here using two familiar tools of economists, those of the Lorenz and generalized Lorenz dominance criteria. In the process, we extend the old result of Fellman (1976) for a one-dimensional tax, and we make use of a result due to Rietveld (1990) for multi-dimensional inequality comparisons. A key component in the theoretical reasoning is an "alignment property", which describes how capital and wage income are empirically related, i.e. if they are positively or negatively correlated. This issue and other empirical characteristics will be discussed in what follows with reference to empirical attributes of the Norwegian DIT.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we demonstrate, by means of a variety of simple examples, that "almost anything can happen" to inequality in the aggregate when a DIT is applied to a distribution of income coming from two sources; this shows that the scope for definitive analytical results is in general quite limited. In Section 3, we give definitive analytical results for some scenarios with real-world relevance: under certain carefullydefined conditions on labor and capital income distributions, a DIT system does lead to an unambiguous inequality reduction. In Section 4, we discuss the concept of implicit redistribution between peoples' labor and capital income components, and obtain other definitive results also with potentially wide application. Section 5 concludes.
Inequality and Inequity Effects: Examples and Discussion
As the simple 3-person example below demonstrates, inequality reduction cannot be expected of a DIT system in general. We show 4 specimen configurations. The 3 persons have varying amounts of wage income in the different configurations, but unvarying capital incomes. The (fixed) dual tax system comprises a progressive labor income tax, at marginal rate 50% above a threshold wage w = 4, and a proportional tax at rate 25% on capital income, in all cases. Gross incomes are equal across persons in case A but net incomes are not, hence the DIT causes an inequality increase in this case. Supposing that income measures living standard, classical horizontal inequity (HI), or the unequal tax treatment of pre-tax equals, is induced in case A. In none of the other cases are there ties between gross income values, hence no classical HI is induced by the DIT in any of those cases. In case B, overall inequality is reduced (there is a Lorenz improvement), and there is no reranking of persons in the transition from gross to net incomes. Overall inequality is exacerbated in case C and reduced in case D, and both cases involve reranking. The DIT induces what has become known as "reranking HI" in these cases. 9 We shall not consider horizontal inequity issues further in this paper, focusing entirely on vertical equity, i.e. upon overall inequality effects. For more on the HI effects of a DIT system, see Bø, Lambert and Thoresen (2012) and Kristjánsson (2012) . 10 9 See Lambert and Yitzhaki (1995) for distinctions between the classical and reranking HI concepts, both in the case of an income tax and more broadly, for example in legal systems. 10 The former uses copula-consistent indices of disassociation between pre-tax and post-tax equivalent incomes (living standards) to analyze reranking horizontal inequity for the Norwegian DIT; the latter introduces a general Gini and concentration coefficient-based methodology to analyze redistributive effect, à la Kakwani (1977) , which covers both classical and reranking horizontal inequities, and applies this to the Icelandic DIT (which has been in place since 1996). In Lambert and Thoresen (2011) , the copula dominance test for enhanced reranking is explained with reference to the examples in Table 1 of this paper.
Can we see the sort of factors which typically militate against an inequality-reducing outcome for a DIT system, in terms of the configurations shown in Table 1 ? As one moves between scenarios in this example, many phenomena are in play at once, even though both the characteristics of the DIT and the distribution of capital income components remain the same for all cases. First, the pre-tax wage distributions have different inequality in all 4 cases; second, the levels of pre-tax wages are also different in all cases (as are the totals), which implies different relative importances for wages versus capital incomes between scenarios; and third, the wage income tax, being linear above a threshold that is exceeded in case C, does not have the same total number of taxed units in all cases. But any one of these differences can be isolated in further examples (for example, keeping the same degree of pre-tax wage inequality, or the same pre-tax total wages), and still enough degrees of freedom remain to be able to produce diverse overall inequality outcomes (the reader is invited to experiment with this).
Hence the scope for definitive analytical results on the overall inequality effect of a DIT system is in general quite limited.
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However, analytical headway is possible for certain polar forms of association between labor income and capital income components across persons. By focusing on "alignment properties", the progression of the wage income tax and reranking (if any), some definitive results can be traced out.
Unambiguous Inequality Reduction: Some Analytics
Let pre-tax income be x w d   where w is wage income and d is capital income, and suppose that the wage income tax is incentive-preserving and progressive, and the capital income tax is proportionate. Let the post-tax values corresponding to w and d be v and k respectively, and let post-tax income be y = v + k. Supposing that the labor income tax is progressive and the capital income tax is proportional, the Fellman (1976) result tells us that:
where p measures a person's rank in the gross (and net) wage distributions, and an obvious notation is adopted for pre-and post-tax Lorenz curves. In Calonge and Tejada (2011) , a "perfect alignment property" is assumed for much of their analysis, according to which the pre-tax values w and d increase 11 To take an extreme example, in which poor people receive only wage income and rich people receive only capital income, with no gross income overlaps between groups, fiscal policies may well reduce inequality within each subgroup but raise it overall; even with progressive labor and capital income tax schedules one can obtain a regressivity pattern for a DIT. A numerical example in Lambert (2001, p. 194) can readily be adapted to demonstrate this point.
together from person to person. This is not the case in any of the specimen scenarios in our Table 1 . An "inverse perfect alignment property" would have gross wage income increasing and gross capital income falling from person to person, as in all of the scenarios in our Table 1 . This may be more realistic for some real world applications, e.g. where persons who are poor in labor income are rich in capital income and vice-versa. In fact, the rate structure of the DIT gives incentives to trade-off wage income against capital income. In the Norwegian case this has been clearly seen among owners of small businesses: Thoresen and Alstadsaeter (2010) show that business owners were able to take advantage of the lower taxation of dividends under the Norwegian DIT, by shifting organizational form and thereby changing the sources of payments. See also Pirttilä and Selin (2011) for a discussion of similar effects for the Finnish DIT. Moreover, the vast increase in dividend income in combination with the concentration of share ownership in Norway under the DIT (for instance, in 2004 approximately 95 percent of dividends were received by individuals in decile 10), suggests that the "inverse perfect alignment property" should not be ruled out. We will return to this issue shortly, when referring to results for Norway.
Definitive analytical results are possible, given one or other of these two alignment properties, under which the DIT is overall inequality reducing: (IIb) if
PROPOSITION

Let
, the DIT is inequalityreducing regardless of the relativity between a and b; 
, the DIT is inequalityreducing.
We discuss the statement of the Proposition and then its implications. First, note that the Proposition hinges on pre-tax conditions (namely, on the alignment property or its inverse, on the pre-tax wage income share a and on the pre-tax distributional information held in the Lorenz curves L D and L W ), as well as on the distributive stance of the wage income tax (which determines L V relative to L W ) and finally, of course on the DIT's design, which in conjunction with distributional properties determines the post-tax wage income share b relative to a and whether or not reranking occurs. Under Calonge and Tejada's (2011) perfect alignment property, no reranking is possible: the pre-tax values w and d increase together from person to person and since the tax schedules are assumed incentive preserving, so do the post-tax values. This is a particularly straightforward case to analyze. 12 We introduced the perfect inverse alignment property both for its symmetrical appeal and also for its potential realism, but doing so has raised a new problem. Under this criterion, reranking of income units can occur in the transition from overall pre-tax to overall post-tax incomes, as our numerical scenarios C and D demonstrate. Major analytical complications arise when different rankings are involved for different income concepts, and indeed, reranking is consistent both with inequality exacerbation (scenario C) and inequality reduction (scenario D). We have had to rule it out in order to achieve the definitive results in part (II) of the Proposition. The proof of both parts of the Proposition is given in the Appendix.
It must be pointed out that the Proposition is silent on pre-and post-tax inequality comparisons in the many cases not covered by the sufficient conditions of parts (I) and (II). In some cases, a Lorenz worsening will be observed and in others, Lorenz curve intersections. There is scope for deeper research on this issue. Our result in part (Ia) is established by Calonge and Tejada's (2011) Proposition 2. The inequality reduction we observed in case B in Table 1 is explained by part (IId), since 0.6 = a > b = 0.57 and
in this case. Our inverse alignment results 12 In Laborda (2006) , a perfect alignment property is proposed between labor income and capital gain income, such that the latter is an increasing, twice differentiable and weakly convex function of the former. This property is extremely strong, and in fact only leads to overall inequality reduction (and then quite trivially) when capital gain income is proportional to labor income.
cannot explain the inequality reduction observed in case D of Table 1 , because reranking occurs in that case. We turn to the reranking issue shortly. Whether the perfect alignment property or its inverse is the more fitting in any application is ultimately an empirical question. In respect of their study, Calonge and Tejada (2011) indicate a Spearman rank correlation coefficient between gross wage and capital incomes for a large sample of Spanish taxpayers in the region of 0.20. For Norway in 2000, we find a value of 0.09 for the Spearman measure, which is in the center ground between the values for perfect alignment (+1) and perfect inverse alignment (-1). 13, 14 Although the analytical results in the Proposition are driven by the assumption in (1) of a flat tax on capital income, some countries are now introducing progression into their capital income tax schedules and it is worth noting that the results of part (I) of the Proposition, yielding inequality reduction under the perfect alignment hypothesis, also hold in their entirety for the case of a progressive capital income tax schedule (see the Appendix for a demonstration of this). Things are more complicated under the inverse alignment hypothesis, principally because of the reranking that can arise. It would be an interesting exercise to test whether, by restricting this hypothesis to the top of the income distribution where dividends and capital gains are highly concentrated, one could find sufficient conditions for inequality reduction in that part of the income distribution. This is left to future research.
Finally in this section, we turn to the issue of reranking, which is a difficult one. Reranking in any tax system mitigates or can outweigh a positive vertical effect, that of inequality reduction.
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For a DIT, relatively strong 13 We used individual level data, omitting transfers and self-employment income, for the Norwegian estimates. See Lambert and Thoresen (2009) and Thoresen, Bø, Fjaerli and Halvorsen (2012) for evaluations of Norwegian redistribution using the standard household income framework, and Lambert, Nesbakken and Thoresen (2010) for Norwegian redistribution in an international context. 14 As a matter of curiosity, we calculated that a > b for this data, and checked how closely condition (Id) or (IId) is met despite the non-alignment. We find that
(1  p)  1 for large portions of the Lorenz configuration, ruling out (IId). After the tax reform of 2006, when individual dividend income became taxed above a rate-of-return allowance (see Sørensen 2005) , we find that a  b , close to what is expected for a comprehensive schedule. If the perfect alignment property would have held then, the system would have become overall inequality-reducing regardless of Lorenz curve configuration. 15 With X and Y as pre-and post-tax income variables, the income redistribution effect towards the poorest 100p% overall, 0  p  1 , can be written in terms of Lorenz curves as Lambert, 2001, p. 207) . Letting C Y X ( p) be the concentration curve for post-tax incomes with respect to the pre-tax ordering, we can write this as conditions on the joint distribution of labor and capital incomes can ensure an inequality reducing effect. An encouraging stride in relaxing such conditions has recently been made by Kristjánsson (2012) , who has developed a Gini measure of inequality reduction for a DIT with clear properties, and this can accommodate both classical horizontal inequity and reranking. Use of the Gini coefficient to measure inequality reduction instead of Lorenz dominance represents a loss of generality, of course; and, as Kristjánsson notes, the computation of the overall Gini effect itself may not be straightforward in cases where changes in the joint income distribution and/or DIT parameters cause the ordering of persons by their overall incomes to vary. 
Implicit Redistribution between Labor and Capital Incomes
Here, we aim to supplement the results seen so far, to obtain conditions with empirical content. Specifically, we examine the implicit redistribution which may take place between labor income and capital income sources in the case of a DIT system -and which, if it did, would ensure overall inequality reduction, thus providing another perspective on the issue which concerns us.
A result due to Rietveld (1990) , applicable to any multi-dimensional inequality comparison, implies for us that overall inequality after application of the DIT will be no more than in the more unequal component. That is, (2)
(where, as in the Proposition, b is the post-tax share of wage income in total income). Applying (1), this yields (3)
. Now using the fact that a generalized Lorenz curve ( ) GL p is the product of mean income and the corresponding Lorenz curve ( ) L p , and measures cumulated income per capita up to percentile p (Shorrocks, 1983) , we can write (3) as
measure respectively the vertical and reranking effects of the tax system (see also ibid., page 40). Even if the vertical effect is positive (which need not be so), the reranking term can outweigh it. 16 A challenge for the understanding of reranking in the case of differentiated taxation of two income components is that in addition to the "between" tax schedules effect, e.g., the difference between the taxation of capital and wage income, there may also be a "within" tax schedule effect. In the Norwegian case, for example, taxation of earned income depends on geographical location (lower tax in some areas in the north of Norway). Bø, Lambert and Thoresen (2012) describe how (total) reranking effects can be empirically investigated; a further clarification of how the different sources of reranking of a differentiated tax system contribute to the overall evaluation is certainly needed, as is the establishment of "benchmarks" for the identification of various components.
(ii) effects holds, the degree of progression in wage taxes introduced in step (iii) is immaterial for overall inequality reduction.
We do not think such a perspective has been seen before. In the Norwegian case in the year 2000, for example, we find that g w  0.29 , g D  0.20 and 0.27 g  . Clearly, according to an "implicit redistribution" assessment, the separate schedules have not acted in concert as described in the paragraph above: wage losses at low percentiles cannot have been outweighed by capital income gains at those percentiles, as is also indicated by the results of Section 3. This is partly explained by capital income being highly concentrated among people at the top end of the income distribution, likely due to the lower tax rate on capital income relative to that on labor income at the time. In particular the distribution of dividend income was extremely skewed under the Norwegian DIT of 1992.
This form of analysis illustrates in particular the distributional challenge that policy-makers will face when moving from a comprehensive income tax in the direction of a DIT. One may find distinct patterns of implicit redistribution at different times and in different countries, also influenced by the precise design of the DIT in force. The insights of this section can, we think, be helpful.
Conclusion
In this paper we have explored the overall inequality effects of an in place, pureform DIT system. We have shown by simple examples that correlations between distributions of wage and capital income, the degree of tax rate differentiation in the DIT, and reranking of taxpayers can all be expected to complicate a general analysis. We have traced out what can be said definitively, obtaining clear sufficient conditions for unambiguous inequality reduction in terms of pre-tax conditions, the distributive stance of the wage income tax and other characteristics of the DIT. We have also identified the nature of the implicit redistribution between labor and capital income which is sufficient to ensure inequality reduction.
Elements of the DIT have been introduced in several countries, but how such tax systems influence overall income inequality has not been much discussed, save for the very limited literature cited here. The question of designing a DIT with the strong property that overall net incomes Lorenz dominate overall gross incomes remains very much open for further study. The sufficient conditions charted out in this paper constitute a beginning. 
Appendix: Proof of The Proposition
in this case, because reranking cannot occur under the perfect alignment of labor and capital incomes. Now subtract (A) from (B), using (1):
The perfect alignment proof is immediate from the following consequences of (C): 
For perfect inverse alignment, w(p) increases with p and d(p) decreases with p, hence when we cumulate the lowest 100p% of incomes ( ), 0
xp   , we include the lowest 100p% of labor income components ( ), 0 wp   and, actually, the highest 100p% of capital income components, whose share in total capital income is given by   
There may or may not be reranking in this case. In the absence of reranking, we similarly have (F)   
The perfect inverse alignment proof is immediate from the following consequences of (G): 
Finally, note that if we replaced condition (1) in the main text by (1*)
p (0,1) , which would hold if the capital income tax were progressive as well as the labor income tax, and if we then followed the steps that led to (C) above, we would instead be led to
from which all parts of (D) still follow. Hence part (I) of the Proposition also holds for a progressive capital income tax schedule.
